Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing by Masao Ogaki & Qiang Zhang
DECREASING RELATIVE RISK AVERSION AND TESTS OF RISK SHARING
1
MASAO OGAKI AND QIANG ZHANG
Department of Economics
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210
     U.S.A.
Tel: (614) 292 5842 (M.O.),   (740) 366 9436 (Q.Z.)
Email: mogaki@ecolan.sbs.ohio-state.edu, zhang.100@osu.edu
Abstract
It has often been argued that that the relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient should decrease as a
household becomes wealthier.  However, existing tests of full (consumption) risk sharing
hypothesis in the empirical literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing
or constant RRA (CRRA).  We therefore use a Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA)
utility, which includes increasing, constant, and decreasing RRA as special cases, to test the full
risk-sharing hypothesis.  Using IFPRI and ICRISAT data, we find strong evidence in support of
the decreasing RRA hypothesis, along with evidence favoring full risk-sharing hypothesis at the
village level, and rejecting it at the inter-village level.  When RRA is restricted to be constant, we
replicate the previous results in the literature: reject the full risk-sharing hypothesis at both levels.
Our tests, however, reject this restriction and favor decreasing RRA in almost all cases.  These
results suggest that it is important to allow for decreasing RRA in testing the full risk-sharing
hypothesis when data containing low-income households are investigated.
Key Words: Consumption Risk Sharing/Smoothing, Relative Risk Aversion, Generalized
Method of Moments
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1. INTRODUCTION
The relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient of a household whose consumption is close
to the subsistence level may be very high.  For example, if consumption is exactly at the
subsistence level, the household may not be willing to bear any risk, and both the
absolute and relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficients could be infinite.  If this is the
case, then the RRA coefficient must be a decreasing function of wealth for poor
households.  Therefore we should allow the possibility of decreasing RRA (DRRA) in
testing the full risk sharing hypothesis.
2  However, existing tests in the empirical
literature are derived using preferences that exhibit either increasing or constant RRA
even when they are applied to data containing low-income households (see, e.g. Altug
and Miller (1990), Deaton (1990), Morduch (1990), Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991),
Townsend (1994), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), and Sawada (1996)).  We
therefore use a Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility, which implies
increasing, constant, and decreasing RRA as special cases, to test full risk-sharing
hypothesis.
Using the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) data for Pakistani
households and the International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) data for Indian households, we find evidence in support of the DRRA
hypothesis, along with evidence favoring full risk-sharing hypothesis at the village level,
and evidence against the hypothesis at the inter-village level.  When RRA is restricted to
be constant, we replicate the previous results in the literature: reject the full risk-sharing
                                                       
2 This intuition is based on our introspection.  Arrow (1965), based on the boundedness of utility function,
argues that RRA should increase with wealth over the whole domain of utility function, though some
fluctuations in RRA are likely.2
hypothesis at both levels.  Our tests, however, reject this restriction and favor DRRA in
almost all cases.  These results suggest that it is important to allow for DRRA in testing
the full risk-sharing hypothesis when data containing low-income households are
investigated.
A unique feature of the IFPRI data set is that food consumption and income data were
collected separately from different members of each household.  This feature is attractive
for our purpose, because our tests, like most of the existing tests of full risk sharing,
require the assumption that the measurement error in consumption is not correlated with
income variables and their measurement errors.  The ICRISAT data set has been used
extensively in development economics.  Townsend (1994) uses it to test the full risk
sharing hypothesis.
3  It is encouraging that our test results are qualitatively similar for
these two data sets.
Existing evidence is consistent with the idea that the RRA is decreasing for low-
income households.  For example, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) find that the
share of risky assets in household portfolio is positively correlated with income and
wealth level in data for Italian households.  Kessler and Wolff (1991) find that the share
of wealth invested in risky assets is, in general, increasing with wealth for French and
American households.  Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) report that Indian farmers are
in general risk-averse, but the wealthier they are, the less their investment portfolios are
affected by increasing weather risk.
4  
                                                       
3 Townsend (1994) experimented with subsistence consumption and found it to be insignificant.  It should
be noted that the exponential utility function he uses implies increasing RRA even with a positive
subsistence parameter.
4 Using survey data on a representative U.S. age group (51-61), Barsky et al (1997) find that RRA tends to
increase slightly from the first to the third wealth quintiles and decrease slightly from the third to the fifth3
 We present our model and derive testable implications in Section 2.  In Section 3 we
explain our tests for full risk sharing.  The empirical results are in Section 4.  Section 5
concludes the paper.  The IFPRI data are described in the Data Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
     Consider an economy with H households participating in a risk-sharing pool.
5  We
assume that preferences of each household are additively separable between consumption
and leisure and are described by a discounted sum of expected felicities over time.  We
also assume that households have the identical time discount factor and probability beliefs
on the states of the world.  The Pareto-efficient consumption sharing rule is given by a
programming problem (similar to that of Townsend (1994, pp.556-557)) of maximizing
the weighted sum of discounted household expected utilities, subject to the resource
constraint that the sum of household consumption is less than or equal to the aggregate
consumption available to the pool in each period.  We denote the aggregate consumption
by Ca(t).
6
     How RRA varies with wealth has important implications on consumption under full
risk sharing.  Given the welfare weights, the consumption sharing rule depends only on
Ca(t), according to the well-known Mutuality Principle.  Let  ( ) ) (
* t C C a h  be the sharing
rule for household h.  Because of the time separability assumption for preferences,
                                                                                                                                                                    
quintiles.  Barsky et al are interested in relatively low values of RRA relevant for asset pricing, hence their
survey questions are not designed to detect possible very high values of RRA for poor respondents.
5 Because of the subsistence parameter which will be introduced into the model, there are technical
difficulties with starting from individual utility functions as described by Zhang (1998).  Zhang’s test
results are quantitatively similar to ours when he takes these difficulties into account.4
Wilson’s (1968) Theorem 5 holds in each period in the programming problem above.
Hence  a h dC dC
*  is inversely proportional to household h’s absolute risk aversion
coefficient.  Consumption growth, ( )
* *
h a h C dC dC , is therefore inversely related to RRA.
Suppose that RRA decreases with wealth.  Then the consumption growth rates of the rich
households are higher than those of poor ones when Ca(t) increases, and are lower than
those of the poor ones when Ca(t) decreases.  Hence the growth rate of consumption of a
rich household will fluctuate more than that of a poor one.  This is in contrast with the
result under constant RRA that the consumption growth rate is identical for all
households in the pool.
To parameterize flexible (i.e. increasing, decreasing, or constant) RRA in a
parsimonious way, we now assume that the utility function for household h takes the
common form















where g  is the preference parameter that governs whether the RRA coefficient increases
or decreases with the level of wealth.  To take into account of the demographic effects in
a simple form,  ) (t Ch  is defined as total household consumption divided by the adult
















                                                                                                                                                                    
6 The aggregate consumption depends on the history of states, but we suppress it throughout this paper to
ease the exposition.5
If g  is zero, (2) reduces to the constant RRA case.  If g  is positive, RRA decreases with
consumption and approaches a asymptotically.  A negative g , on the other hand,
implies that the RRA coefficient rises with consumption.  A usual interpretation for
positive g  is subsistence consumption.  Hence we will call it the subsistence parameter.
The intertemporal first order conditions for the programming problem imply that for
any state of the world
(3)        ( )













where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
a m m b f
1 1 | 1 1 + + = + t t t t prob t , and  ( ) t m  is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the resource constraint at period t.
Equation (3) holds for each h.  Since  ( ) 1 + t f  is independent of h,  g - h C , the
consumption in excess of the subsistence level, should grow at the same rate for all
households in any state of the world.  This is because idiosyncratic risk is insured away
through the optimal risk sharing arrangements.
3. ECONOMETRIC METHOD
We assume that consumption is measured with error:
7
(4) ) ( ) ( ) ( t t C t C h h
m
h x + = ,
where  ( ) t C
m
h  is measured consumption in per adult-equivalent terms, and  ) (t h x  is
measurement error.  Then combining (3) and (4), we obtain




h gf g f ,
                                                       
7 Ogaki and Atkeson (1997) discuss the choice between additive and multiplicative measurement errors.
They suggest that an additive specification would be better for the purpose of testing risk sharing.6
where  ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t t t t v h h h x f x + - + = + .
Now assume that  ) (t h x  is uncorrelated with household h's permanent and current
income variables and their measurement errors.  Let  yh
p be a proxy of its permanent
income, and  ) (t yh  be a measure of its current income.  Let  ) (t Zh = (1, yh
p, ) (t yh D )' be the
vector of instrumental variables.  Let y = (f (2),,...,f (T), g ) be the T-dimensional vector
of unknown parameters and y 0 be the corresponding vector of their true values.  T is the
number of the time periods of the sample.  In addition, let  ) ), 1 ( ( y + t C f
m
h  be the 3-
dimensional vector
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Then we have 3(T-1) orthogonality conditions
(7)                   ( ) , 0 ) (
1
lim ) ( 0
1
0 = = ￿
=
¥ ﬁ y y
N
h
h N h H f
N
p f E
where EH  is the expectation operator over households. y can be estimated using
Hansen (1982)’s Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
8  Compared with
Townsend’s (1994) method for panel data, our method has the advantage of allowing for
a general form of serial correlation.
                                                       
8 We use the Hansen/Heaton/Ogaki Gauss GMM package for estimation and testing.7
We consider two types of tests.  The first type is the 
2 c  test of the over-identifying
restrictions (i.e. Hansen's J test).  Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing, the
disturbance term in (5) is uncorrelated with the income variables in the instrumental
variables set.  Therefore, the J test statistic has an asymptotic 
2 c  distribution.  Under the
alternative hypothesis of incomplete risk sharing, the disturbance in (5) will be correlated
with income variables.  Hence the J test statistic will tend to be large.
 The other type of test is based on variable addition.  We add the income difference
term to (5) to obtain:




h h gf g f .
Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing,  0 = h , because the model implies that
individual income change should play no role in explaining individual consumption
growth when the effects of subsistence consumption and aggregate shocks are controlled
by the parameters g  and  ) (t f .  However, under the alternative hypothesis of incomplete
risk sharing, individual income variables will affect individual consumption growth even
after controlling for these effects.  For example, take the alternative of Keynesian
consumption function,  h h by a C + = , where 0<b<1.  Under this hypothesis, if current
income is measured without errors, GMM estimation for (8) would result in  1 ) ( = t f  and
b = h .
9  In our empirical work, this test is conducted at two levels.  At the village level
we test if the h estimate is significantly different from zero for each village.  At the
pooled district level, we test if the h  estimates of all the villages in the same district are
                                                       
9 If current income is measured with error, the probability limit of our estimator for h is smaller than b,
but it is positive.  So the variable addition test still has power against this alternative hypothesis.8
jointly significant.  This is done by computing the likelihood-ratio type test statistic,
which is the difference between the constrained Hansen's J statistic and the unconstrained
J statistic (see, e.g. Ogaki (1993, Section 7)).  The variable addition test is more directly
related to the alternative hypothesis of incomplete risk sharing than Hansen’s J test, and
therefore is arguably more powerful.  The test is similar to the ones based on regression
of consumption change/growth on individual shocks frequently seen in the empirical risk
sharing literature.
 Another experiment that we will do is to examine what happens if we force  0 = g  in
the estimation and testing.  Forcing  0 = g  is equivalent to what other researchers have
done in their tests.  If we can replicate the result of rejecting the null of full risk sharing at
the village level when we impose this restriction, but can not reject it when allowing g  to
be estimated, then we can be confident that it is the restriction  0 = g  that is driving the
rejection of the model.  In turn, we can test whether or not this restriction itself is
reasonable by constructing another likelihood-ratio type test.
4. DATA
 In this section, we describe the IFPRI data collected in Pakistan.  The description of
the ICRISAT data can be found in Townsend (1994) and Atkeson and Ogaki (1996).  The
IFPRI data used in this paper cover the period from April 1986 to September 1989.
10
During this period, 12 rounds of interviews were conducted at each sampled household.
In each interview, a male questionnaire and a female questionnaire were used separately
                                                       
10Although the survey covered at least six years, the data set does not contain consumption data for the
fourth year.  Hence we use the data up to 1989.9
for collecting different data.  The male questionnaire consisted of about 170 questions
and was mainly about production, marketing, financing, various revenues, male labor
supply and hiring, and nonfood expenditures.  The female questionnaire had around 120
questions, and was mainly about demographics, food consumption, health status of
children, and female labor supply.  Food consumption data included purchases of 37 food
items, and consumption from gifts and own production.  The original survey started with
974 households at 52 villages in four districts.  These four districts were distributed in
three provinces in Pakistan: Punjab, Sind, and Northwest Frontier Province.  Following
Townsend (1994), we use demographic information in each household to calculate male-
adult-equivalent household size, according to the equivalence scales provided by Ryan,
Bidinger, Pushpamma, and Rao (1985). These scales are weights assigned to each
member of a household according to his/her age and sex.  Specifically, the scales are: 1.0
for males 19 or older, and .9 for females of the same age group; .94 and .83 for males and
females, respectively, aged between 13 and 18; for children of either gender between 7
and 12 years old, .67; for children aged 4-6, .52; for those aged 1-3, .32; and for infants,
.05.  In each round of the survey, the status of each member was recorded: present,
traveling, or moved to a new household.  The annual household size used in this paper is
the weighted average of male-adult-equivalent household sizes of all rounds in a year.
The annual income and food consumption expenditure data calculated by IFRPI are
used in the empirical analysis.  The income measure includes nine subcategories: rental
earnings in crops, net crop profits, farm wage income, non-farm income, net livestock
profits, returns to capital, remittances, pension, and zakat.
11  Since data on total
                                                       
11 Private loan association.10
consumption are not readily available, we test risk sharing for food consumption.
Assuming that food consumption is separable from other consumption categories, the
model in Section 2 applies to food consumption.  We calculate a village-specific food
price index using the food prices provided by IFPRI.  Then we use the index to deflate
food consumption and income to obtain real food consumption and real income.
12  For
our purpose, using food consumption is attractive for three reasons.  First, our tests
assume that the measurement error in reported food consumption is uncorrelated with
income variables.  Because food consumption and income variables are essentially
collected from different household members, this assumption is more likely to be valid.
Second, subsistence consumption is more likely to be important for food than for
nonfood.  Third, the aforementioned age-sex weights were obtained from dietary studies,
and are more appropriate if used only for food consumption.  It is not clear how to obtain
appropriate adult-equivalent scales for nonfood consumption.
The data for Village 52 and Villages 15 to 20 are missing.  We exclude from our
sample the households with incomplete information on any of the following: the age-sex
composition, the food consumption, and the income level for each of the three years.
Concerned about sample size, we also exclude the villages with less than 11 households.
As a result, in our sample, we have 633 households in 31 villages.  To conserve space, we
do not report detailed data information here.  However, it should be helpful to note, for
the purpose of interpreting the empirical results, that the three-year whole-sample average
                                                       
12 Although some nonfood consumption data were collected, they were in nominal terms.  It is not clear to
us how to obtain real nonfood consumption since prices for nonfood items were not recorded.11
for food consumption is 2,646 Pakistani rupee (in terms of 1986 rupee, when 1 rupee =
US$.063.)
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
 This section reports empirical results based on food consumption data from the IFPRI
and the ICRISAT data sets.
13
    The test results for different districts in the Pakistani data are presented in Tables I to
IV.  In each table, the first row reports the baseline results in which g  is restricted to be
equal across all villages in the sample, and full risk sharing is assumed within each
village by restricting  ) (t f  to be equal across the households in the same village.  In each
district, the J test in the first row does not reject the null hypothesis of full risk sharing at
the five percent level.  The point estimate of g  is positive and statistically significant in
all districts except for Dir.  The point estimate for Dir is negative, but it is not
significantly different from zero.  Because the standard error for g  is much larger for Dir
than is for the other three districts, the data for Dir do not seem to contain much
information about g .
 In the second, third, fourth, and fifth rows, the likelihood-ratio type test statistic, C, is
reported, which is the difference between the J value for each row and that for the first
row.  The degree of freedom for the C test in each row is the difference between the
degree of freedom of each row’s J test of and that of the first row.  In the second row, we
impose the restrictions that  ) (t f  is the same across villages, an implication of full risk
sharing across villages.  We find overwhelming evidence against the restriction for each
                                                       
13 The results based on Indian total consumption are similar, see Ogaki, Zhang, and Atekeson (1997).12
district from the C statistic reported in the second row.  The third row reports the variable
addition test results.  A significant coefficient for income change indicates rejection of
full risk-sharing for that village.  We do not reject this hypothesis for most villages.  The
exceptions are Village 1 in Table I and Village 22 in Table III).
14  The C test of this row,
on the other hand, tests the joint hypothesis that all the coefficients on the income
changes are equal to zero.  The C test does not reject it, and hence the null hypothesis of
full risk sharing within villages.
The fourth row reports the results when g  is allowed to be different across villages.
The C test does not reject the restriction that g  is the same across villages.  The fifth and
sixth rows report the results when g  is restricted to be zero.  This corresponds to
Townsend's (1994) model, except that he uses an exponential utility function.  The C test
strongly rejects this restriction in the fifth row for all districts except for Dir.  The C
statistic reported in the sixth row is the difference between the J value in this row and
that in the fifth row.  The J test in the fifth row and the C test in the sixth row test the null
hypothesis of full risk sharing with constant RRA.  These tests reject the null hypothesis
of full risk sharing in all districts except for Dir.  These results indicate that one can find
evidence against full risk sharing when decreasing RRA is ignored.
 Table V presents the results for the ICRISTA data.  The test results in this table are
consistent with those obtained in the IFPRI data set.  The first row reports the baseline
results, where the J test does not reject the null hypothesis of full risk sharing at any
                                                       
14 In the variable addition test, we also used the income net of remittance, which could rise and help smooth
consumption in bad times.  However, the test results are not qualitatively different.  The income in
ICRISAT data is already net of remittance, and include crop profit, labor income, profit from trade and
handicrafts, and profit from animal husbandry.  See Table A.I. in Townsend (1994).13
conventional significance level.  The point estimate of g  is positive and statistically
significant.  As in the Pakistani data, the results reported in the last two rows indicate that
one can find evidence against full risk sharing when decreasing RRA is ignored.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have tested the full risk sharing hypothesis while taking into account
the effect of estimating a parameter that allows the RRA coefficient to vary with the level
of wealth.  For 29 out of 31 villages in the Pakistani data, and every village in the Indian
data, we do not reject the hypothesis of full risk sharing within each village.  It is not
surprising that we have two villages as exceptions, for Townsend (1995) finds that
different villages in low-income countries have strikingly different institutional
arrangements to cope with risk.  We, however, find strong evidence against risk sharing
across villages in both data sets.  These results confirm the following intuition drawn
from the information economics literature.  Incomplete risk sharing can be caused by
moral hazard or adverse selection, which are in turn caused by private information.  It is
more likely to be present in a large community, or in an economy with complicated
production technologies.  Without private information, various arrangements can be used
by the community to share risk even if financial markets are not well developed.  Hence
full risk sharing can be a good approximation of the consumption growth pattern for a
village economy in low-income countries.  On the other hand, full risk sharing across
villages, especially those far away from each other, is less likely to occur because private
information may become a problem.14
When we restrict the RRA coefficient to be constant, our tests replicate the well-
known results of rejecting the full risk sharing hypothesis even within villages in both
data sets, except for one district, Dir, in the Pakistani data.  However, except for this
district, our tests always reject this restriction in both data sets.  Thus, this paper shows
that misleading results may be obtained when decreasing RRA is ignored in testing full
risk sharing hypothesis.  In the empirical risk sharing literature, isoelastic, quadratic and
exponential utility functions are often used.  Because these utility functions imply either
constant RRA or increasing RRA, the test results based on these preference specifications
need to be interpreted with caution.15
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Table  Table I     GMM Results for Food Consumption- I     GMM Results for Food Consumption-   Faisalabad Faisalabad
(IFPRI-Pakistan)




Dy t 1 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 2 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 3 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 4 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 5 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 6 1 ( ) +
   J    C
Within 1511     …     …     …     …     …     …   25.7   …
    Vil. (124)  (.316,23)
Across 1447     …     …     …     …     …     …  115.2 89.55
    Vil.  (80)  (.000,33)   (.000,10)
Within 1474  .1659  .0012  .0361  -.0168  .0013 -.0046 19.7 5.95
    Vil. (146) (.0797) (.0190) (.0316) (.0504) (.0153) (.0108)  (.289,17)   (.429,6)
Within  …     …     …     …     …     …     … 19.7 7.73
    Vil.  (.459,18) (.172,5)
Within  0     …     …     …     …     …     …   71.3  45.6
    Vil.  (.000,24)   (.000,1)
Within    0  .2808  .0273  .0134  -.0626 -.0053  .0002   49.2  22.1
    Vil. (.0699) (.0139) (.0308) (.0486) (.0106) (.0105)  (.000,18)   (.001,6)
               ________________________________________________________________________________________
              Notes:  1. Standard errors are in parenthesis under the estimates, except for the two columns for the J and C
              statistics, where the numbers in parenthesis are p-value and degree of freedom, respectively.   Since each village
              has 6 orthogonality conditions, the total number of orthogonality conditions for the baseline estimation is 36.
             There are 13 parameters estimated, 12  ( ) t f ’s and g .  The degree of freedom is therefore 23.   2. The subscript of
             income difference term denotes village identification number, e.g. 1 for Vil. 1.   3. J is a c
2 statistic, and C is a
             likelihood-ratio type statistic.   4. The subsistence estimates for Villages 1 to 6, in the fourth row, are (with
             standard errors in parenthesis) as follows: 1851 (215),1467 (240), 1131 (803), 1326 (335), 1738 (206), -512
             (2411), respectively.18
 Table  Table II     GMM Results for Food Consumption-  II     GMM Results for Food Consumption- Attock Attock
              (IFPRI-Pakistan)




Dy t 7 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 8 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 9 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 10 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 11 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 12 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 13 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 14 1 ( ) +
  J  C
Within 1867     …     …     …     …     …     …     …    …  37.8  …
    Vil. (117) (.187,31)
Across 1820     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    …  556.9 519.1
    Vil. (77) (.000,45) (.000,14)
Within 1749    .0214  .0013  .0785 -.0304 .0221 .0257  -.0618 .0079 28.1 9.7
    Vil. (148) (.0423) (.0284) (.0472) (.0163)  (.0606)  (.0211)  (.0501)  (.0203) (.212,23) (.290,8)
Within   …     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    … 24.4 13.4
    Vil. (.441,24) (.063,7)
Within  0     …   …     …     …     …     …     …    …  122.0 82.2
    Vil. (.000,32) (.000,1)
Within    0  .0525  .0437  .0151 -.0573   .0199   .0509 -.0736 .0387 57.8 64.2
    Vil.  (.0397)  (.0184)  (.0161) (.0135)  (.0640)  (.0171) (.0557)  (.0140) (.000,24) (.000,8)
       __________________________________________________________________________________________________
See the notes for Table I.  The subsistence level estimates for Villages 7 to 14, in the fourth row, are (with standard errors
in parenthesis): 1998 (294), 1978 (172), -1445 (2175), 1936 (347), 1532 (607), 2018 (259), 1.9e+5 (1.9e+7), 2256 (265),
respectively.19
           Table     Table III    GMM Results for Food Consumption-  III    GMM Results for Food Consumption- Badin Badin















































1 y t ( ) +
   J   C
Within 1441     …    …    …     …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    44.2  …
    Vil. (84)  (.420,43)
Across 1701     …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    326.0   282.2
    Vil. (48)  (.000,63) (.000,20)
Within 1434  .046  .110 -.047  .002  .019  .015  .005 .025 .044    .046 .029  28.8 15.4
    Vil. (100) (.038) (.050) (.046) (.067) (.012) (.022) (.013)  (.036)  (.034)  (.036)  (.032)  (.630,32) (.165,11)
Within  …     …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …    …   …   …  29.4   14.8
    Vil.  (.647,33) (.140,10)
Within  0   …    …    …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …   …    92.9   48.7
    Vil.  (.000,44) (.000,1)
Within    0  .040  .124 -.079  .041  .027  .051   -.010   .047   .033   .040 -.005  50.4   42.5
    Vil.  (.038)  (.052)  (.042)  (.066)  (.013)  (.011)   (.012)  (.036)  (.028)  (.035)   (.020)  (.000,33) (.000,11)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 See the notes for Table I.  The subsistence level estimates for Villages 21 to 39, in the fourth row, are (with standard errors in
parenthesis): 1627 (385), 2018 (74), 1625 (147), 1760 (86), 1850 (18), 1254 (138), 1453 (334), 1405 (174), 2082 (221), 7172
(2e+5), 1768 (355), respectively.20
                                                       Table  Table IV   GMM Results for Food Consumption-  IV   GMM Results for Food Consumption- Dir Dir
                                                                                            (IFPRI-Pakistan)




Dy t 41 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 42 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 45 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 47 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 48 1 ( ) +
coeff.
Dy t 51 1 ( ) +
   J    C
Within -207     …     …     …     …     …     …   19.8   …
    Vil. (905)  (.652,23)
Across  976     …     …     …     …     …     …   58.3 38.48
    Vil.  (387)  (.004,33)   (.000,10)
Within -317  .0387  .0019 -.0003  .0024 -.0055  .0235 15.2 4.62
    Vil. (1555) (.0340) (.0324) (.0110) (.0064) (.0202) (.0261)  (.570,17)   (.593,6)
Within  …     …     …     …     …     …     …
    Vil.
Within  0     …     …     …     …     …     …   19.9  .06
    Vil.  (.703,24)   (.806,1)
Within    0  .0380  .0035  .0008  .0022 -.0088  .0018   17.2  2.7
    Vil. (.0339) (.0318) (.0098) (.0063) (.0139) (.0186)  (.511,18)   (.845,6)
   ________________________________________________________________________________________
  See the notes for Table I.  No convergence achieved for the fourth row.21
Table  Table V   GMM Results for Food Consumption V   GMM Results for Food Consumption
                                            (ICRISAT-India)                                             (ICRISAT-India)
________________________________________________________________________
Risk                                                  coeff.         coeff.        coeff.            J                C
Sharing       g A
         g S        g K   Dy t A( ) +1
 Dy t S( ) +1  Dy t K( ) +1
Within        237.3      237.3     237.3       …              …                 …              46.2               …
    Vil.          (15.2)                                                                                         (.507, 47)
Across         269.7     269.7     269.7       …              …                 …             1239.4          1193.2
    Vil.          (14.0)                                                                                         (.000, 63)     (.000, 16)
Within         238.4     238.4     238.4      .024           .011             .005              41.3             4.88
    Vil.          (16.1)                                 (.013)        (.011)          (.016)         (.589, 44)     (.181, 3)
Within         237.9     233.1     240.5        …             …                 …               46.1               .03
    Vil.          (21.4)     (30.3)    (30.6)                                                             (.425, 45)     (.985, 2)
Within            0            0            0            …             …                 …               114.5             68.3
    Vil.                                                                                                             (.000, 48)     (.000, 1)
Within
    Vil.              0            0            0          .012           .033             .012              102.3            12.2
                                                               (.011)        (.010)          (.016)         (.000, 45)     (.007, 3)
________________________________________________________________________
    See the notes for Table I.  Subscripts A, S, and K denote Aurepalle, Shirapur, and
    Kanzara, respectively.